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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the determinants of the outcomes of patent
applications (withdrawal, refusal or grant). The application process at the European
Patent O¢ ce is modelled in three stages, using a Trivariate Probit model with double
selectivity correction in order to test whether the applicantspatenting history has
an e¤ect on the outcome of the current application. I investigate the behavior of the
applicant after the patent o¢ ce has established the "state of the art", a precondition
to an invention being patentable. The main results are (i) rms with large patents
portfolios act following a "trial and error" strategy, by applying for large numbers of
patents and thereafter waiting for the patent o¢ ces nal decision when the expected
probability of grant is high, (ii) the technological importance of a patent is a crucial
determinant of a successful application grant, (iii) a withdrawal is to be regarded
as an expected refusal, since applicants tend to withdraw their applications when
there is evidence that the inventions cannot be considered to be novel or to involve
an inventive step.
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1 Introduction
Firmspatenting activity is of great interest to economists and policy makers, as patent
counts are a measure of innovation, admittedly in an imperfect way. The interest of
research into strategic management has also dramatically increased as patent activity
becomes an important ingredient of a rms competitive strategy. A surge in patenting
took place in the mid 1980s in the three main patent o¢ ces, the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark O¢ ce (USPTO), the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) and the Japanese Patent O¢ ce
(JPO). This worldwide growth in patent applications has been described e.g. in OECD
(2004).
Within the EPO procedure, the patent o¢ ce establishes the state of the art by issuing
a search report that contains a list of prior art. The applicants then have the possibility
to withdraw their applications if they consider that the search report is negative, i.e. if it
contains evidence that the claimed invention is not novel or does not involve an inventive
step, or to maintain it if their expected probability of getting a grant is high. Substantial
examination follows if the application is maintained. The EPO procedure di¤ers from the
USPTO and the JPO, in which the search and substantive examination are undertaken
in one phase.
The aim of this paper is to study the determinants of the outcomes of patent applica-
tions (grant, refusal or withdrawal). The main hypothesis tested is that the applicants
patenting history has an e¤ect on the outcome of the current application. This paper also
tests the behavior of the applicant after the state of the art is established by the patent
o¢ ce.
Van Dijk and Duysters (1998) found that basic research, which explores more novel
and unknown paths, meets the patentability requirement more often, whereas Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) show that the characteristics that increase the probability
of a grant at the EPO are: international applications through the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT), research cooperation between domestic researcher, research cooperation
with foreign researchers and the designation of a limited number of countries in the
application.
This paper di¤ers from the before mentioned existing studies in several aspects: (i)
The literature so far focused on patent applications and patent grants only. While more
than half of all patent applications indeed receive a grant, a large number of all patent
applications are withdrawn by the applicants and only a few of them are refused a grant
by the EPO (see Harho¤ and Wagner, 2006). I explicitly model the possibility that rms
can withdraw their patents. (ii) The outcomes of the patent procedure is modeled by
taking into account the sequential aspect of the applicants and patent o¢ ces decisions
within an econometric framework using a Trivariate Probit Model with double selection.
3
(iii) Firm heterogeneity and patent citation measures are taken into account by using a
database linking patents, citations and rms data, where earlier work only studied the
e¤ect of patent-based variables.
The main results are (i) rms having large patent portfolios follow a "trial and error"
strategy by applying for huge numbers of patents and thereafter waiting for the EPOs
nal decision when the expected probability of grant is high; (ii) the "importance" of
a patent, as measured by the number of forward citations is a crucial determinant of a
successful application; (iii) applicants tend to withdraw their applications when the result
of the preliminary search report issued by the patent o¢ ce is negative. In that sense, a
withdrawal is generally an expected refusal, (v) the grant/refusal decision made by the
patent o¢ ce is more di¢ cult to predict than with a "one-step" model that compares the
probability of grant to all other outcomes.
Section 2 briey summarizes the application process at the EPO. Section 3 presents
the economic background; the data are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 describes
the variables used and Section 6 provides summary statistics. The empirical model and
the results are presented in Section 7, which is followed by concluding remarks.
2 Application process, outcomes and cost of patenting
at the EPO
I rst describe the application procedure at the EPO and then the associated costs.
2.1 The patent application process
The EPO was founded in 1978 as the result of the European Patent Convention (EPC).
Within this framework, a single and centralized application is made, designating the
signatory states of the EPC in which protection is sought for. The EPO system allows
the applicants to choose the jurisdictions, among the contracting states of the EPC, in
which protection is sought for. Thus, a patent provides the applicant with protection in all
the designated states. If patent protection is sought for in more than three EPC countries,
an EPO patent application is less costly than direct applications in each national patent
o¢ ce. Applicants may, however, apply for a patent at the EPO for an invention that had
previously been applied for at a national patent o¢ ce, within twelve months after the
rst application (priority application).
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Figure 1: Examination of patent applications at the EPO
Prior art search Examination of the application
Patent Application Final decision
Application withdrawn Patent refused
Patent granted
Request for
examination
Application withdrawn
Search report
Max. 6 months
Figure 1 provides a simple presentation of the application process at the EPO. The
application is published 18 months after the date at which the European or national
priority application was led. A search report describing the state of art is published
either with the application or later on. It contains references to prior patents or scientic
publications, classied in di¤erent categories according to their relevance for the nal
decision. After the search report is published, applicants have six months to decide
whether or not to pursue their application by requesting substantive examination. If
no request for examination is led within the six months, the application is deemed to be
withdrawn. If the renewal fee or any other fee were not paid in due time, the application is
also deemed to be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the application can also be explicit, under
the form of written correspondence between the applicant and the patent o¢ ce, at any
time before or during the examination process. A withdrawal typically takes place when
the search report issued by the patent o¢ ce contains evidence that the claimed invention
is not novel, or does not involve an inventive step, in the sense that the applicant expects
the patent not to be granted.
If examination was requested by the applicant, the application is examined by the
patent o¢ ce according to three criteria: novelty, inventive step and industrial applica-
bility. The application then may end up with a grant or a refusal to grant. A request
for examination does, however, not necessarily lead to a nal grant/refusal decision by
the EPO, in the sense that the applicants still have the possibility to withdraw their
application after having requested examination1 . Under examination, applicants receive
additional information on the patentability of the invention and can then choose whether
to withdraw the application, or to wait until the EPOs nal decision.
According to the EPC, if a European patent is granted, competence is transferred to
the designated contracting states, where it a¤ords the same level of legal protection as
a national patent and is valid for 20 years from the date of ling, if it is consecutively
1 I thank Stefan Wagner for pointing this fact out.
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renewed.
If the applicants seek patent protection in several countries, they have the possibility
to ll an application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT, e¤ective since the early
1980s), to be led at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Since a
large share of applications in this study are led under the PCT, it is worth describing
the procedure briey. A PCT application is an international agreement for ling patent
applications having e¤ect in all designated countries. Although the PCT system does
not provide for the grant of an international patent, the system does simplify the process
of ling patent applications. Under the PCT, an inventor can le a single international
patent application in one language, with one patent o¢ ce in order to simultaneously seek
protection for an invention in up to 183 countries. Such a procedure gives the applicant
more time to decide whether to apply for the patent or not and in which of the 183 PCT
member countries. Our database contains PCT applications in which the applicants have
designated the EPO, so called "Euro-PCT" applications.
Chapter I of the PCT procedure consists of sending the application to an International
Searching Authority (ISA), which is a national or regional patent agency, for carrying out
the search on the state of the art. The EPO is responsible for more than half of the
searches. Once the report is provided by the ISA, the applicant has three possibilities:
(1) transfer the application to national or regional patent o¢ ces among those desig-
nated in his application,
(2) elect an International Preliminary Examination,
(3) withdraw the application.
Chapter II of the PCT procedure comes into play once the international preliminary
examination is chosen by the applicants. If the Euro-PCT application is transferred to
the EPO, the outcome of the preliminary search report is taken into account.
As indicated by Harho¤ and Wagner (2005), PCT lings can be advantageous for the
following reasons:
(1) they allow the expansion of patent protection to a large number of countries
without incurring the full costs and complexity of national application paths,
(2) applicants will receive an international search report within a relatively short time
period, informing them about prior art that may be relevant for the own applications
likelihood of being granted,
(3) PCT lings allow applicants to delay decisions about the countries for which they
want to designate the application for up to 30 months after the priority date, which is
helpful if the applicant ignores the value of the invention.
6
2.2 The cost of patent applications
The cost an applicant has to incur throughout the whole patenting procedure is an im-
portant factor for the applicants decision to maintain or terminate the application. The
applicant is going to maintain the application in the process as long as the prospects for
future prots are greater than the cost of the application. Thus it is worth mentioning
the main components of the cost of a patent application at the EPO. However, given the
variety of situations an applicant can be faced to and the complexity of the procedure,
this cost can hardly be summarized with a single gure. In this subsection, I give a brief
overview of the fees an applicant will have to pay at the di¤erent stages of the application
procedure.
The nature of the fees and costs can be divided into three categories:
 Pre-ling costs comprise all the elements related to the drafting of the rst ap-
plication.
 Procedural fees have to be paid once the application has been led at the EPO.
These costs are summarized in Table 1 and do not include the administrative costs
an applicant can be asked to pay.
Table 1: Procedural fees
Nature of fee Amount (€)
Filing fee * 90.00
Search fee 690.00
Designation fee ** 75.00
Renewal fee for the application 3rd year 380.00
4th year 405.00
5th year 430.00
6th year 715.00
7th year 740.00
8th year 765.00
9th year 970.00
>10th year 1,020.00
Examination fee 1,430.00
Grant fee *** 715.00
* if filed online, € 160.00 otherwise
** per contracting designated state, up to seven countries
*** incl. printing up to 35 pages, €10.00 per additional page
source: "Schedule of fees and costs", supplement to official Journal
OJ EPO 2/2005
 Notice that this schedule only applies to "Euro-direct" applications. If the applica-
tion has been applied through the PCT route, additional fees have to be paid. For
example, the fee for the preliminary examination of an international application is
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e 1; 530. The same applies if the patent was applied for at a national patent o¢ ce
prior to the EPO application. The applicant also has the possibility to request the
services of a patent attorney or a legal representative for guidance throughout the
procedure which leads to additional expenses.
 Post-grant costs are probably the most expensive part of the procedure. Once a
patent is granted by the EPO, the applicants have to translate the document in each
o¢ cial language of each designated state. Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006)
estimate this cost at about e 1; 700 per language. In addition, the patent has to
be enforce and maintained in each jurisdiction by paying the renewal fees in each
of them.
Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) estimate that the procedural and transla-
tion cost of the "average" patent that designates three countries (the UK, Germany and
France) is e 8; 070. The same patent that designates 13 countries will cost about e
20; 175. These gures can be compared to the cost of application (excluding renewal fees)
at the USPTO (e 1; 856) and at the JPO (e 1; 541).
It is di¢ cult to quantify the cost of application at the EPO with accuracy. Thus, in
the analysis, I will use indirect measures such as the number of designated states, PCT
applications, number of claims or if a patent attorney acted as a legal representative.
3 Theoretical background
The usual way to model patenting behavior in economic theory is to consider two or more
rms "racing" for an invention. The winner of the race will then patent the invention,
that is assumed to be granted with probability one.
However, the outcome of a patent application is essentially the result of a strategic
interaction between the patent o¢ ce and the applicant. Régibeau and Rockett (2003)
assume that the applicant maximizes its private prot, while the patent o¢ ce maximizes a
social welfare function. In their model, the decision made by the patent o¢ ce is imperfect,
in the sense that there is a probability of erroneous judgement, i.e., that the patent o¢ ce
confers patent protection to a invention that is not novel or that the patent o¢ ce rejects
an application that meets the patentability requirements. The probability of error is a
negative function of time, as longer examination periods enable more thorough reviews,
lowering the probability of error that will enter the rms prot function.
To explain early or late withdrawals, one could think that the distance between the
actual quality of the invention and the quality standard set by the patent o¢ ce enters
the erroneous judgement function. The higher this distance is, the easier it is for the
patent o¢ ce to demonstrate lack of novelty or inventive step. The actual quality of
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the application is however observed with some noise by the patent o¢ ce, which might
be inuenced by its capability to perform e¢ cient searches and examinations or the
willingness of the applicant to hide the true potential of the application. In some cases,
unexperienced applicants might even be unaware of the quality of their own inventions,
compared to the quality standard of the patent o¢ ce.
In that event, applicants might withdraw their applications because the search report
demonstrates that conicting prior art exists. These early withdrawals take place when
the quality of the invention is low compared to the patent o¢ ces standard.
If the lack of novelty is more di¢ cult to demonstrate, possibly because the appli-
cant tries to hide the true quality of the application, substantial examination will be
requested, where the rm gets additional information on the patentability of the inven-
tion and updates the expected probability of grant. In this scenario, the application will
be maintained as long as the probability of erroneous judgment enables positive private
prots.
4 Data sources
In Section 5 I make several hypotheses regarding the e¤ects of a set of variables on refusals,
withdrawals and grants, that I derive from the existing literature. The hypotheses are
easier to expose if I rst describe the dataset at my disposal.
The data was compiled from four main sources:
1. The CEBR patent database contains all the patents applied for by at least one
Danish rm at the EPO since the creation of the EPO in 1978 up to 2003. The
initial database contains 12,109 patent applications. A major advantage of this
database is that a unique rm identier has been attached to the patent assignees,
the so-called CVRnumber (central rm registry number) to nd exact matches
between the rm names and addresses in the patent data and the rm name and
addresses in the nancial data (the KOB data, see below).
We identify a total of 2,822 unique Danish non-person patent applicants, a total of
1,152 Danish private applicants (see below for the denition of "private applicants")
and a total of 591 foreign (co-) applicants. Both the Danish private applicants
and the foreign applicants have been assigned unique identication numbers. We
therefore have the entire population of patents applied for by Danish rms at the
EPO, with an exact match with the rm-level data. More details on the database
and how it was constructed can be found in Kaiser and Schneider (2005).
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2. The EPO/OECD citations database contains information on citations made in
the patent applications, as well as information on the citations received by all EPO
patents applied before October 2004. More information on the citation database
can be found in Webb et al. (2005)
3. The KOB data provides us with rm level data. KOB A/S is a private rm that
has specialized in collecting and processing data on Danish businesses. Our dataset
is an image of the data that can be found on http://www.kob.dk/. This dataset is
described in detail in Bennedsen et al. (2006)
4. Finally, the number of claims has been searched manually for each patent appli-
cation via http://ep.espacenet.com/
In order to include the number of forward citations (the number of citations received
from subsequent patents) within ve years after the patent application and allow for
ample examination time, I restrict the dataset to patents that were applied for before
January 1st 1998.
5 Variables
The dependant variables and explanatory variables are described in turn.
5.1 Dependent variables
All dependent variables are binary. The purpose is to explain both the decision to with-
draw an application, after search report and during examination, or to maintain it, and
the subsequent decision made by the patent o¢ ce to grant the patent or not. The appli-
cation procedure outlined in Section 2 shows that withdrawals can take place before or
during the substantial examination phase. These decisions might be driven by di¤erent
factors, thus they are going to be analyzed in di¤erent equations.
My empirical model considers three dependent variables of which the nal decision
by the EPO is observed if the application has not been withdrawn during examination,
which in turn is conditional upon a request for examination after the search report has
been received by the applicant.
Request for Examination/withdrawal after search report. This variables takes the value
1 if the applicants have requested for examination and 0 if the application was withdrawn
before examination.
Final decision/withdrawal during examination. For each patent application, we know
whether the applicant decided to maintain it until the EPO makes a nal decision, or to
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withdraw it. The variable takes the value 1 if the application is maintained and 0 if it is
withdrawn during examination.
Decision of the EPO. If the applicant indeed decided to maintain the application, we
observe the decision by the EPO to grant (= 1) or to refuse (= 0) the patent.
5.2 Explanatory variables and hypotheses
This section introduces the explanatory variables used in the multivariate analysis, as
well as a set of hypotheses on the expected e¤ects of experience, citations, patent char-
acteristics, application ways and legal structure of the applicant.
5.2.1 Experience variable
A main explanatory variable is:
Patent applications stock. The e¤ect of this (lagged) stock variable with declining
balance depreciation will be tested. The variable is constructed using the perpetual
inventory method and is dened as:
Ait = (1  )Ait 1 +Nit (1)
Where Ait is the stock of applications of rm i at time t, Nit is the number of patents
applied by rm i at time t and  is the depreciation rate of the patent stock from year
t   1 to year t. As noted by Czarnitzki et al. (2005), the use of a depreciation rate
is justied by the fact that knowledge tends to decay or become obsolescent over time,
losing economic value due to advances in technology. We will make the usual assumption
that  = 15%, see for example Hall (1990). In case of multiple applicants, the sum of the
stock of the collaborating rms is taken.
H1: Experienced rms are more likely to maintain their applications and to have them
granted.
Preliminary hypothesis can be made to explain the (hypothetical) importance of ap-
plicantsexperience:
- They have intrinsically a higher capability to generate patentable ideas.
- They have learned how to draft the documents well, if only due to a greater familiarity
with the application procedure, which increases the chances of future success.
- They have created informal networks at the patent o¢ ce and are receiving special
treatments.
- They know the relevant prior art in the area they are active in.
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5.2.2 Citation measures
The analysis includes both citations made by the application and citations received.
Number of citations made (backward citations). The search report issued by
the EPO lists all the documents regarding prior art that are relevant for the examiners
decision on patentability. Harho¤ et al. (2005) describe in detail how to use citations
assigned to EPO patents.
For our purpose, an interesting feature of the search report made by the EPO is that
the patent references are classied in di¤erent categories according to their relevance. In
addition to the total number of backward patent citations, I will use:
 The number of "type X" citations which indicate that the claimed invention cannot
be considered to be novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when
the referenced document is taken alone.
 The number of "type Y" citations, indicating that the claimed invention cannot be
considered to involve an inventive step when the referenced document is combined
with one or more other documents of the same category, such a combination being
obvious to a person skilled in the art.
 The number of "type D" citations, referring to patent references already mentioned
in the description of the patent application and approved by the examiner.
H2: Conicting prior art leads applicants to withdraw their applications and the EPO
to refuse the grant.
It is obvious that a high number of type X and type Y citations reects a negative
search report, since they imply that the invention is not novel, which is expected to lead
the applicant to withdraw the application or the patent o¢ ce to refuse the grant.
H3: Applicants mastering the state of the art are less likely to withdraw their applica-
tions.
Type D citations are references already mentioned by the applicant when the appli-
cation was submitted. This type of citations could reect the fact that the applicant has
a good command of prior art. The probability to maintain the application up to the nal
decision is expected to increase with the number of type D citations.
Reference to the Non-Patent Literature (NPL), might also be a relevant variable to
include in the regression. However, this data is only available for patents applied for after
1990. Therefore they will not be used in the analysis.
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Number of citations received (forward citations). Trajtenberg (1990) showed
that the number of citations received from subsequent patents is highly correlated with
the social value of the underlying invention. Since then, this indicator has also become one
of the most validated measure of the private value of the patent rights, see e.g. Harho¤
et al. (1999) or Hall et al. (2005). Thus, the number of citations the patents receive
from other EPO patents within ve years after the publication date will be included. The
number of forward citations also indicates that the patent has contributed to the state
of the art, since it measures the "importance" of the patent. The e¤ect of the number
of forward citations is expected to be positive both on the probability to maintain the
application and on the probability to obtain the grant.
H4: Valuable or technologically important patents are more likely to be granted and
less likely to be withdrawn.
A high number of forward citations indicates that a patent is valuable and techno-
logically important. This should lead applicants to maintain their applications and the
EPO to grant the patent. This of course, requires that both the applicant and the patent
o¢ ce are aware of the potential value of the patent at the time the patent is applied for
and examined.
5.2.3 Patent characteristics:
Number of IPC assignments. During the examination period, a patent is assigned to
a number of codes from the International Patent Classication (IPC) system, according
to its applicability for di¤erent technology areas. Lerner (1994) interprets the number of
(IPC) assignments of a patent as the "scope" of this patent, whereas other authors prefer
to take it as a measure of the complexity of the invention (Harho¤ and Wagner, 2005).
Number of claims. In the same way as the number of IPC assignments, the number
of claims, which delimit the boundaries of a patent by describing precise features of the
invention, can be interpreted as the "scope" or "breadth" of a patent as well as an indi-
cator of complexity, see Harho¤ and Reitzig (2004) or Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
According to EPO rules, a claims fee is payable for the eleventh and each subsequent
claim. Although this fee is marginal2 , applicants seem to be sensitive to this rule, as
more than 60% of the patents in our sample contain ten claims or less (see Appendix B).
Therefore, I include a dummy variable for applications containing more than ten claims.
Both these variables can thus be interpreted in contradictory ways, as each additional
claim and/or IPC assignments could either mirror a broad patent by increasing its scope
2The fee for the eleventh and each subsequent claim is 40,00 Euros
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or breadth, or make the description of the invention more precise, narrow and specic,
thus reducing the scope of the patent.
H5: The number of IPC assignments and a high number of claims positively inuence
the probability for an application to be granted.
Theses two variables have been found to be "time-zero" value indicators, since they
reect the price the applicant is willing to pay for a given patent at the time of the
application. They can also be interpreted as the technical complexity and/or the scope
of the patent.
5.2.4 Application ways
Number of designated states. The "Family size" is the number of jurisdictions in
which patent protection is sought for. We do not, however, observe the entire patent
family, thus I use the number of designated states member of the European Patent Con-
vention (EPC)3 . Harho¤ et al. (2003) and Lanjouw et al. (1998) show that the family
size is a patent value correlate.
H6: The higher the number of designated states, the higher the probability of grant
and the lower the probability to withdraw the application.
The total number of designated states has been found to be a "time-zero" value
correlate (like the number of IPC assignments and the number of claims, see above).
This is very intuitive, since applicants have to pay an additional fee for each jurisdiction
in which protection is sought for, thereby increasing the geographical scope of protection.
PCT application. A dummy variable indicates whether PCT Chapter I or II appli-
cations have been led for the invention.
H7: Applications that went through the PCT procedure Chapter I only have a higher
probability of early withdrawal, whereas applications that went through the whole PCT
procedure (Chapter I and II) have a lower probability of withdrawal.
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2002) give arguments for and against a positive role
of PCT applications. The PCT procedure provides the applicants with a longer period
to decide whether to apply for a patent or not, which enables them to assess the market
potentials more thoroughly. The decision to transfer the applications to the EPO might
therefore be an indicator of higher quality. On the other hand, the PCT procedure might
3The EPO memebers are Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, United Kingdom (from Oct. 7, 1977), Sweden (joined May 1, 1978), Italy (Dec. 1, 1978),
Austria (May 1, 1979 ), Lichtenstein (April 1, 1980), Greece and Spain (Oct. 1, 1986), Denmark (Jan.
1, 1990 ), Monaco (Dec. 1, 1991), Portugal (Jan. 1, 1992), Ireland (Aug. 1, 1992), Finland (March 1,
1996), Cyprus (April 1, 1998)
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be a sign of inventions with unclear market potential. In their analysis, Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) nd that applications that went trough the rst part of
the PCT application procedure only (PCT I for short) have a lower grant rate, which
they interpret as an unclear market potential. They argue that applicants only want to
benet from the longer delay to decide in which jurisdictions to apply, whereas applicants
going through the whole PCT procedure (PCT II) are more aware of the value of their
inventions.
Number of applicants and number of inventors. These variables are included
in order to measure the importance of collaborations in patent applications. The idea is
to test whether collaboration is a source of higher technical quality, leading to a higher
probability of grant. See Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002).
H8: Collaborations between applicants and inventors lead to successful applications.
Joint patent ownership is assumed to be a sign of technical quality. The propensities
to pursue and to grant should thus be positively inuenced by the number of co-applicants
and co-inventors.
Legal Representative. Any applicant at the EPO may be represented by:
- A professional representative on the list maintained to this purpose by the EPO
(Art. 134(1) of the EPC).
- Legal practitioners (Art. 134(7) EPC)4
- Employees (Art. 133(3) EPC), typically from the IP department. The employee(s)
must work for the applicant and not for an economically connected company.
We introduce a dummy variable indicating wether the applicant had any legal repre-
sentation.
H9: Firms legally represented are less likely to withdraw their applications.
Although the e¤ect of legal representation has not been investigated in the economic
literature, it is expected to inuence the probability to maintain an application, as legal
representatives are familiar with the procedure.
5.2.5 Ownership structure
I introduce dummy variables which indicate the legal form of each rm involved in the
applications, in order to check whether the rm structure has an impact on either stage
4A Legal practioner may act as representative if he/she fullls the following criteria:
1. is qualied in one of the Contracting States,
2. has his place of business within such State, and
3. is entitled, within the said State, to act as a professional representative in patent matters.
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of the model. These dummies can, to some extend, also be interpreted as a proxy for rm
size.
H10: Stock listed rms have, compared to other company forms, a lower propensity to
withdraw their applications and a higher probability of grant
Large rms, in our case stock listed rms, are expected to have a higher propensity to
pursue their applications, since this type of rms have more resources and typically have
an IP department.
6 Descriptive statistics
6.1 Outcomes of the patent applications
The number of Danish patent applications has been steadily increasing since 1978, fol-
lowing a trend at the EPO level, see Kaiser et al. (2005). A major challenge related to
this unprecedented increase in patent applications and increasing workload is to maintain
high quality in patent examination.
Figure 2 presents the timing of the application process with the number of occurrences
at the di¤erent stages. A patent grant is the most frequent outcome, followed by with-
drawals during examination. Relatively few applications are directly refused a grant by
the EPO.
Figure 2: Timing of the application process
Withdrawal
430
Request for examination
Withdrawal
1,147 Refusal
191
Application maintained
until final decision
Grant
3,579
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the outcomes of the patent examinations by ap-
plication years from the beginning of 1978 to the end of 1997. In order to include citation
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measures, I only take into account the applications published by the EPO. A major-
ity of patent applications, 66%, is granted in the time window covering the application
years of this study, from 1978 to 1997, while a relatively high number of applications,
29%, are withdrawn by the applicants. As pointed out by Harho¤ and Wagner (2005),
the withdrawal of a patent application occurs generally after the applicant received a
"su¢ ciently negative search report or skeptical communication from the examiner". In
addition, about 3:5% of the applications end up with a refusal. The 316 pending appli-
cations (for which the outcome is not known yet) are discarded from the analysis. The
sample under consideration contains 5347 observations.
Figure 3: Distribution of outcomes
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Table 2 summarizes the outcome of the applications between 1978 and 1997 by tech-
nology class, using the so called OST classication, provided by the O¢ ce des Sciences
et Techniques, the French Patent O¢ ce (INPI) and the Fraunhofer ISI Institute, which
is based on a concordance with IPC classes. The table shows an uneven distribution
of outcomes across technology classes. When considering the six aggregated technology
classes, one can see that the grant rate varies from 63:8% in "mechanical engineering"
(technology class V) to 69:9% in "Processing Engineering" (technology class IV). In the 30
more narrow areas, the di¤erences are even stronger, but the low number of applications
in some of the areas makes it di¢ cult to compare them. Notice, however, the relatively
high grant rate, 69:7%, in "organic ne chemicals" (area 9), which is the area where the
Danish patent applicants are most active in (446 applications) and in "Macromolecular
chemistry, polymers" (area 10) in which the grant rate is 80:7% with 119 applications.
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Table 2: Outcomes by technology areas
area OST technology class Granted (%) Refused (%) Withdrawn (%) Total % of total
I  Electricity - Electronics 66.30 2.99 30.71 368.00 6.88
1 Electrical devices - electrical engineering 65.87 3.59 30.54 167.00
2 Audiovisual technology 71.43 3.81 24.76 105.00
3 Telecommunications 69.64 1.79 28.57 56.00
4 Information technology 51.52 0.00 48.48 33.00
5 Semiconductors 42.86 0.00 57.14 7.00
II Instruments 68.94 3.05 28.01 689.00 10.73
6 Optics 71.11 6.67 22.22 45.00
7 Analysis, measurement, control 65.64 3.37 30.98 326.00
8 Medical engineering 72.01 2.20 25.79 318.00
III Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 67.41 3.16 29.44 1,488.00 23.17
9 Organic fine chemicals 69.73 3.59 26.68 446.00
10 Macromolecular chemistry, polymers 80.67 1.68 17.65 119.00
11 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 59.05 3.81 37.14 210.00
12 Biotechnology 59.38 1.96 38.66 357.00
13 Materials, metallurgy 76.47 1.31 22.22 153.00
14 Agriculture, food 70.44 5.91 23.65 203.00
IV Process engineering 69.86 3.37 26.77 919.00 14.31
15 General technological processes 72.55 1.96 25.49 153.00
16 Surfaces, coatings 51.72 3.45 44.83 29.00
17 Material processing 71.13 3.78 25.09 291.00
18 Thermal techniques 68.89 2.22 28.89 135.00
19 Basic chemical processing, petrol 66.67 2.78 30.56 144.00
20 Environment, pollution 71.86 5.39 22.75 167.00
V Mechanical engineering 63.78 4.57 31.65 1,226.00 19.09
21 Mechanical tools 65.55 5.04 29.41 119.00
22 Engines, pumps, turbines 77.95 2.36 19.69 127.00
23 Mechanical elements 62.77 5.19 32.03 231.00
24 Handling, printing 63.24 3.78 32.97 370.00
25 Agriculture & food machinery 58.33 5.95 35.71 252.00
26 Transport 63.25 4.27 32.48 117.00
27 Nuclear engineering 66.67 0.00 33.33 3.00
28 Space technology, weapons 42.86 14.29 42.86 7.00
VI Other 65.91 3.81 30.29 657.00 10.23
29 Consumer goods & equipment 59.75 3.46 36.79 318.00
30 Civil engineering, building, mining 71.68 4.13 24.19 339.00
Total 66.93 3.57 29.49 5,347.00 100.00
6.2 Firm-level data
There are 2; 510 unique applicants in the dataset, which are summarized in Table 3 with
respect to their ownership structure. Table 4 indicates the weight of each company form
in the total number of patent applications. 34% of the rms in the dataset are stock
listed limited companies (A/S), accounting for 64% of the patents applied. The database
counts a high number of "persons" or private applicants (25:7% of the applicants) which
are involved in 10:7% of the applications. An applicant is dened as being privateif (i)
there is no indication that the applicant is non-private (for example there is no A/Sfor
stock listed rms), (ii) the applicant name is a family name followed by rst names and
(iii) the applicant could neither be found by our manual nor by our automatic searches.
Sole proprietorships, foreign (co-) applicants and private limited companies (ApS) follow.
Notice that the legal form could not be determined for 1:4% of the applicants, corre-
sponding to 0:7% of the applications. These rms were typically out of business by the
time we made the search and we were not able to nd information about them. The other
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company forms account for less than 1% of the applications. The table shows that the
grant rate is rather high for applications in which foreign rms are involved, as well as for
applications by public rms or stock listed companies. The grant rate is lower than the
average for applications involving private applicants (persons) and sole proprietorships.
Table 3: Firm structures - Number of unique applicants
Legal form Number of firms %
Limited company (A/S) 850 33.9
Person 645 25.7
Foreign firm (with no connexion to Denmark) 369 14.7
Sole proprietorship 283 11.3
Private limited compagny (APS) 246 9.8
Form unknown 35 1.4
General partnership (I/S) 29 1.2
Foundation (FON) 11 0.4
Public firm 8 0.3
Non-profit association 8 0.3
Cooperative with limited liability (AmbA) 7 0.3
Limited partnership (K/S) 5 0.2
Cooperative (AND) 4 0.2
Foreign firm-wich has registered a branch or place of business in Denmark 3 0.1
Branch of foreign limited company (FAP) 2 0.1
Insurance company (FAS) 2 0.1
Commercial foundation (ERF) 1 0.0
Company with limited liability (SmbA) 1 0.0
Limited partnership by shares (P/S) 1 0.0
total 2,510 100.0
Table 4: Distribution of outcomes by rm structure
Legal form Number of patents % Granted (%) Refused (%) Withdrawn (%)
Limited company (A/S) 4,009 64.5 70.4 3.4 26.2
Person 666 10.7 56.6 4.1 39.3
Foreign firm (with no connexion to Denmark) 563 9.1 74.4 2.8 22.7
Private limited compagny (APS) 380 6.1 63.9 3.7 32.4
Sole proprietorship 347 5.6 59.1 4.6 36.3
Non-profit association 50 0.8 50.0 4.0 46.0
Form unknown 45 0.7 55.6 2.2 42.2
General partnership (I/S) 35 0.6 54.3 5.7 40.0
Public firm 33 0.5 84.8 0.0 15.2
Foundation (FON) 23 0.4 65.2 0.0 34.8
Foreign firm (wich has registered 100.0
a branch or place of business in Denmark) 17 0.3 76.5 0.0 23.5
Limited partnership (K/S) 15 0.2 73.3 0.0 26.7
Cooperative with limited liability (AmbA) 10 0.2 40.0 10.0 50.0
Cooperative (AND) 8 0.1 75.0 0.0 25.0
Branch of foreign limited company (FAP) 6 0.1 100.0 0.0 0.0
Limited partnership by shares (P/S) 5 0.1 20.0 0.0 80.0
Company with limited liability (SmbA) 3 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3
Insurance company (FAS) 2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Commercial foundation (ERF) 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
total 6,218 100.0
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6.3 Past success and outcome of the patent application
Since the relationship between past success and outcome of the patent application is
central in our analysis, it deserves further attention. An advantage from having applied
for patents at the EPO in the past is expected. One may therefore expect patenting
history to increase the applicantschances of getting their patents granted. I will study
the e¤ect of application portfolios, as a measure of rmsexperience.
The relationship between the stock of applications and the outcome in Table 5 is not
clear. The grant rate increases with the stock of applications up to a certain threshold
and then decreases. This issue will be discussed in Section 7.2, together with the other
results.
Table 5: Applications stock and incidence on outcomes
Application stock Grant Refusal Withdrawal Total
0 1,083 77 695 1,855
58.4% 4.2% 37.5% 100.0%
(0, 10] 1,242 69 431 1,742
71.3% 4.0% 24.8% 100.0%
(10, 100] 846 29 189 1,064
79.5% 2.7% 17.7% 100.0%
>100 408 16 262 688
59.5% 2.3% 38.2% 100.0%
Total 3,579 191 1,577 5,347
66.9% 3.6% 29.5% 100.0%
Pearson chi2(6) =184.1900 Pr = 0.000
Outcome
Pearsons Chi squared test, given at the bottom of the table, rejects the hypothesis
of independence between applications stock and outcomes. Thus, there seems to be a
relationship between applicantspatenting history and the outcome of the current appli-
cations.
6.4 Dependent variables
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 6. Firms
have, on average, 44:5 applications in their stock. However, the median, 1:99, indicates
that the distribution is highly skewed and that large application portfolios are owned by
few rms. The number of patent references ranges from 0 to 26, with, on average, 0:83
type X citations, 0:55 type Y citations, and 0:16 type D citations per patent. The number
of forward citations ranges from 0 to 35, with a mean of 1:90 citations received per patent
and has the typical skewed distribution, see gure 4 in Appendix A. The patents have on
average two IPC assignments and 12:57 claims. The applicants typically designate about
eleven states. 16:3% of all applications went through the PCT Chapter I procedure and
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48:6% through Chapter I and II. Regarding the number of claims, comprised between
one and 170 in our data, the division into two sub-groups is motivated by the fact that
applicants seem to be sensitive to the rule stating that a fee is to be paid for each claim
above the tenth. Moreover, the number of claims has a mode and a median of ten, see the
distribution of the number of claims in gure 5 (Appendix B). Therefore, I use a dummy
variable for those applications having more than ten claims rather than the total number
of claims.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variables mean sd min max median
Experience
Stock of applications 44.55 103.14 0 510.84 1.99
Citations
Backward citations 4.22 2.42 0 26 4
Number of type X citations 0.83 1.50 0 17 0
Number of type Y citations 0.55 1.24 0 20 0
Number of type D citations 0.16 0.54 0 6 0
Forward citations 1.90 2.93 0 35 1
Patent characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 2.09 1.19 1 6 2
Number of claims 12.57 11.94 1 170 10
Number of claims>10 40.5% 0 1
Application ways
Number of designated states 11.28 4.17 2 18 11
PCT Chapter I only 16.3% 0 1
PCT Chapter I & II 48.6% 0 1
Legal representative 87.8% 0 1
Number of applicants 1.29 0.62 1 6 1
Number of inventors 1.88 1.34 1 19 1
Number of observations
All applications
5347
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Table 6 (continued)
Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max
Experience
Application stock 6.73 33.07 0 360.32 78.49 141.29 0 510.83 38.53 91.35 0 509.42
Citations
Backward citations 5.00 2.88 0 18 4.17 2.53 0 26 4.14 2.30 0 26
Number of type X citations 1.00 1.90 0 17 0.97 1.62 0 15 0.77 1.40 0 12
Number of type Y citations 0.55 1.37 0 8 0.62 1.37 0 20 0.52 1.19 0 15
Number of type D citations 0.10 0.42 0 4 0.15 0.51 0 5 0.18 0.56 0 6
Forward citations 1.14 1.67 0 13 1.53 2.39 0 22 2.10 3.16 0 35
Patent characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 1.73 0.97 1 6 2.14 1.18 1 6 2.11 1.21 1 6
Number of claims 8.53 7.84 1 91 13.41 11.72 1 90 12.78 12.30 1 170
Number of claims>10 20.7% 0 1 43.8% 0 1 41.7% 0 1
Application ways
Number of designated states 9.20 3.69 2 18 11.753 4.41 2 18 11.37 4.08 2 18
PCT Chapter I only 46.9% 0 1 17.3% 0 1 12.5% 0 1
PCT Chapter I and II 52.2% 0 1 53.1% 0 1
Legal representative 43.8% 0 1 84.8% 0 1 94.0% 0 1
Number of applicants 1.10 0.36 1 3 1.29 0.62 1 6 1.31 0.63 1 6
Number of inventors 1.41 0.79 1 6 2.04 1.46 1 11 1.89 1.34 1 19
Number of observations
non-withdrawn applications
430 3770
Applications withdrawn
during examination
1147
after search report
Applications withdrawn
The comparison between the groups of withdrawn and non-withdrawn applications
shows interesting di¤erences. The applications stock is surprisingly lower for non-withdrawn
applications compared to the ones withdrawn under examination. A possible explanation
is that there are strategic decisions involved. One could think that applicants with large
applications portfolios apply for a high number of patents, possibly for the same inven-
tion, and wait for a nal decision by the patent o¢ ce only when the probability of grant is
high, that is, when no conicting prior art has been found and when positive information
has been received from the examiner.
The average number of "type X" and "type Y" references are higher for withdrawn
applications, whereas the number or forward citations is much higher for non-withdrawn
applications.
Two other important variables seem to be the presence of a legal representative and
PCT Chapter II applications.
The number of IPC assignments, the number of claims, the number of designated
states and the number of applicants are higher for non-withdrawn applications, but the
di¤erence is very small.
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7 Empirical analysis
7.1 Econometric specication
Suppose yi1 and y

i2 are latent variables representing the expected net present (private)
prots to the rms (or individuals) applying for patent i, after receiving the search report
and during examination respectively. Moreover, assume that yi3 is the social welfare func-
tion that the patent o¢ ce seeks to maximize. These variables are not directly observable.
However, we can observe whether the applications are withdrawn or not and whether they
are granted or refused by the patent o¢ ce. Suppose that the latent variables are func-
tions of observable value and quality characteristics of the patent (xi) and an unobserved
part (i) assumed to be jointly normally distributed, which leads to a Trivariate Probit
Model with Double Selection, which is an extension of the Bivariate Probit Model with
Sample Selection due to Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). The choice of this model
is motivated by the fact that it may not be appropriate to analyze the patent o¢ ces
decision to grant the patent or to refuse the grant by using a single-equation model, since
this decision is related to the applicantschoice to withdraw the application or not, prior
to the patent o¢ ces decision. In this model, data on a variable y3 (the EPOs decision
to grant the patent or not) are observed only when another variable, y2 (the applicants
decision to request for the EPOs nal decision or to withdraw the application) is equal
to one, which in turn, is only observed when the third binary variable y1 (the applicants
decision to request for examination or to withdraw the application before the substantial
examination phase) equals one. Formally we have:
yi1 = 1xi1 + i1; yi1 = 1 if y

i1 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi2 = 2xi2 + i2; yi2 = 1 if y

i2 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi3 = 3xi3 + i3; yi3 = 1 if y

i3 > 0, 0 otherwise (2)0B@ i1i2
i3
1CA s N
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0B@ 00
0
1CA ;
0B@ 1 12 13: 1 23
: : 1
1CA
375
(yi2; xi2) is observed only when yi1 = 1
(yi3; xi3) is observed only when yi2 = 1
Thus, there are four types of observations with unconditional probabilities that need
to be taken into account in the construction of the log-likelihood function5 :
5The moel is estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood using the GHK simulator, see for example
Gourieroux and Montfort (1996)
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L =
X
y1=0
ln ( 1xi1) +
X
y1=1;y2=0
ln2 (1xi1; 2xi2; 12)
+
X
y1=1;y2=1;y3=0
ln3 (1xi1; 2xi2; 3xi3;12; 23; 31) (3)
+
X
y1=1;y2=1;y3=1
ln3 (1xi1; 2xi2; 3xi3;12; 23; 31)
Where , 2 and 3 denote, respectively, the univariate, bivariate and trivariate nor-
mal cumulative distribution functions, and the ij are the correlation coe¢ cients between
the error terms. The likelihood function is maximized with respect to the k and ij
(k; i; j = 1; 2; 3; i 6= j).
As Equation 2 suggests, sample selection arises because the observation of y3 (the
patent is granted or refused) is not random, but conditional on the observation of y2 = 1
(the applicants do not withdraw the application under examination) and y1 = 1 (the
applicants request for examination). If the correction was not specied, the model would
take into account the outcomes that are not feasible.
If all the ij = 0, the model can be estimated using three independent probit re-
gressions. However, if the ij are signicantly di¤erent from zero, using single equation
estimates will generate biased coe¢ cients.
Due to the absence of reasonable and economically sound exclusion restrictions I do
not use any. Strictly speaking, exclusion restrictions are not needed, because the model
is identied by non-linearity.
7.2 Results
Table 7 shows the result of the Trivariate Probit estimation. In this section, I discuss the
implication of the estimation results on my set of hypotheses.
H1: Experienced rms are more likely to maintain their applications and to have them
granted.
The applications stock has a positive e¤ect on the probability to request for examina-
tion in Table 7, while the e¤ect is negative on the probability to pursue the application
under examination and then positive again on the grant rate6 . The intuition of this re-
sult is that rms with large portfolios proceed by "trial and error", meaning that they
apply for a high number of patents, maintain the applications until they received full
information on the patentability of the invention through the search report and informal
6A quadratic specication of the application portfolio has been tried, leading to similar results, i.e.,
the squared term was non signicant.
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communications (or negotiations) with the examiner and thereafter wait for a nal deci-
sion only when the probability of grant is high. This is fully is reected by the positive
e¤ect of the variable in the third stage. The results suggest that experienced rms push
the application as far as possible and only wait for a nal decision by the EPO when the
chances to get the patent granted are high.
H2: Conicting prior art leads applicants to withdraw their applications and the EPO
to refuse the grant.
Applications containing high numbers of type X citations tend to be withdrawn more
often. This result is intuitive, given that this type of citations is potentially damaging to
the novelty requirement of the claimed invention. This mirrors a scenario in which rms
withdraw their applications after receiving a negative search report. During examination
the e¤ect of X references is also negative (nal decision/withdrawal under examination
equation), as well as the Y references, which where insignicant at the rst stage. This
result suggests that applicants withdraw their applications after they receive the search
report only when the existence of conicting prior art is obvious (X references). On the
other hand, applications for which the demonstration of the existence of damaging prior
art is more subtile (Y references, that have to be combined with each other in order to
demonstrate conicting with prior art) are more likely to be withdrawn during exami-
nation, possibly because of communications between the examiner and the applicants.
This means that information given to the applicant by the examiner is consistent with
the results of the search report. In the Grant/Refusal equation, the number of type X
citations, the most harmful to the novelty requirement, has a negative impact on the
probability of grant, as expected.
H3: Applicants mastering the state of the art are less likely to withdraw their applica-
tions.
This hypothesis is not conrmed. One possible explanation is that type D references
are often self-citations (a reference to a patent previously applied for by the same ap-
plicant) and do not necessarily mean that the applicant has a good command of prior
art.
H4: Valuable or technologically important patents are more likely to be granted and
less likely to be withdrawn.
My estimation conrms the expectation regarding the number of forward citations,
which is associated with positive and signicant coe¢ cients, meaning that "important"
and valuable patents have lower withdrawal rates and higher probabilities of grant. This
suggests that both the applicants and the examiner are aware of the technological impor-
tance of the applications.
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H5: Time-zero value correlates positively inuence the probability for an application
to be granted.
The technical characteristics (number of claims and number of IPC assignments) are
insignicant in the grant/refusal stage, suggesting that the breadth of the application
and/or the precision of the description of the claimed invention has no e¤ect on the out-
come.7 However, applications containing more than ten claims (i.e. for which applicants
have to pay additional fees) have a higher probability to go through examination, which
suggests that applications involving more than ten claims, for which additional fees have
to be paid are abandoned less quickly.
H6: The higher the number of designated states, the higher the probability of grant
and the lower the probability to withdraw the application.
Regarding the number of designated states, no signicant e¤ect is observed.8 Time-
zero value correlates have in general almost no e¤ect on the application process. This
could be a sign that applicants are either unaware of the potential value of their invention,
or if they are, they do not act consequently.
H7: Applications that went through the PCT procedure Chapter I only, have a higher
probability of early withdrawal, whereas applications that went through the whole PCT
procedure (Chapter I and II) have a lower probability of withdrawal.
Applications that went through the PCT procedure Chapter I are more likely to be
withdrawn under examination, while PCT applications Chapter II have a positive impact
at this stage. This conrms the results found by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2002).
PCT I applications have unclear market potential given that it provides the applicants
with more time to decide whether to extend the right of the patents, whereas applicants
who wait until their application reached the Chapter II procedure are usually more aware
of the market potential of the invention.
H8: Collaborations between applicants and inventors lead to successful applications.
The total number of applicants has a positive e¤ect on the probability to wait until a
nal decision is taken by the EPO, which underlines the importance of collaborations for
successful applications, but is insignicant at the other stages. The number of inventors
does not have a signicant e¤ect on either stage of the model. The individual character-
istics of inventors are probably more important in the determination of the "quality" and
the value of an application. Gambardella et al. (2006) indeed found that the character-
istics of an inventor are an important determinant of the private value of a patent.
7A linear relationship between the number of claims and the outcome gave the same result.
8Di¤erent non-linear specications have been tested regarding the designated states, following Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002), with the same result.
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H9: Firms legally represented are less likely to withdraw their applications.
Professional representatives are successful in pushing the application as far as possible
in the procedure, but no signicant e¤ect is found on the grant/refusal decision.
H10: Stock listed rms have, compared to other company forms, a lower propensity to
withdraw their applications and a higher probability of grant
Finally, regarding the ownership structures, the stock listed rms, typically big rms,
are the only ones to carry a positive and signicant e¤ect, on the probability to wait until
the grant/refusal decision, while the "other" type of rms have a negative impact at this
stage, which is not surprising, since most of these rms did not survive after 1990.
These result highlight another interesting point. Only three variables are signicant
in the grant/refusal equation. This means that the granting process itself is more di¢ cult
to predict than the unconditional grant/refusal model investigated by earlier studies.
In addition to the model described before, I perform several robustness checks. Ap-
pendix C reports the result of a probit model of the probability to grant against the other
outcomes (i.e. the two types of withdrawals and the refusals are pooled), one can see that
it is much more di¢ cult to dene which e¤ect is induced by which player and at which
stage. Moreover, the application stock has an overall negative e¤ect, which is di¢ cult to
interpret.
Withdrawals during examination can be interpreted as expected refusals, since appli-
cants typically withdraw their applications once the examiner asserted that the applica-
tion is likely to be refused a grant. In Appendix D estimates of a bivariate probit model
with selection are reported, in which refusals and withdrawals that took place under ex-
amination are pooled, since the latter can be considered as refusals. The results do not
change very much, but again, the overall negative e¤ect of the stock of applications is
di¢ cult to interpret. The results in Table 7 show that the most "important" or valuable
inventions are maintained until the EPOs nal decision is taken, which suggests that
refusals and withdrawals should be treated separately.
In Appendices E and F, I report the estimation results of an ordered probit model
and an ordered probit with selectivity, respectively. The dependent variable is assumed
to be ordered, because outcomes can be ranked with respect to their implications for the
prots of the applicant, i.e., a refusal is assumed to be the worst outcome possible for the
applicants followed by a withdrawal and a grant. There is no major di¤erence with the
models previously estimated, but again, the stock of applications carries a negative sign.
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Table 7: Estimation results
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Experience
Stock of applications 0.005 *** 0.000 -0.002 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000
Citations
Number of backward citations -0.006 0.015 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.017
Number of type X citations -0.053 *** 0.023 -0.037 *** 0.015 -0.052 ** 0.024
Number of type Y citations -0.019 0.027 -0.057 *** 0.033 -0.009 0.029
Number of type D citations 0.004 0.064 0.025 0.041 -0.030 0.065
Number of Forward citations 0.043 *** 0.018 0.054 *** 0.009 0.056 *** 0.019
Patent characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 0.031 0.034 0.009 0.019 -0.030 0.031
Number of claims>10 0.178 ** 0.078 0.015 0.046 0.081 0.076
Application ways
Number of designated states -0.005 0.010 -0.001 0.006 -0.014 0.010
PCT Chapter I only 0.402 *** 0.102 -0.200 *** 0.074 -0.153 0.119
PCT Chapter I & II 0.211 *** 0.107 -0.121 0.099
Number of applicants 0.210 0.147 0.113 ** 0.056 -0.012 0.097
Number of inventors 0.041 0.039 -0.019 0.017 -0.007 0.029
Legal representative 2.168 *** 0.096 0.372 *** 0.115 0.101 0.158
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.149 0.243 0.315 *** 0.114 0.222 0.197
Persons 0.147 0.252 -0.076 0.121 0.150 0.203
Foreign firm 0.367 0.233 -0.072 0.094 0.110 0.169
Limited compagnies -0.099 0.249 0.062 0.126 0.201 0.212
Sole proprietorships 0.429 0.266 -0.166 0.128 0.116 0.213
Others 0.075 0.252 -0.239 ** 0.123 -0.018 0.209
Technological areas
Electricity-electronics -0.022 0.142 -0.156 * 0.097 0.095 0.167
Instruments 0.154 0.127 -0.058 0.084 0.066 0.137
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 0.255 ** 0.133 -0.137 * 0.081 -0.027 0.128
Process engineering 0.189 0.120 0.008 0.080 0.010 0.126
Mechanical engineering -0.027 0.103 0.026 0.075 -0.072 0.114
Constant -1.784 *** 0.286 0.055 0.247 1.768 *** 0.326
ρ12; ρ31; ρ32
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 1 percent level
** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 5 percent level
* significantly different from the rejection rate at the 10 percent level
Annual year dummies are included in all equations.
Final Decision/
0.139 (0.235); -0.529 * (0.326); -0.708 ** (0.316)
5347
-4071.647
Grant/refusalRequest for Examination/
Withdrawal Withdrawal during examination
The results are summarized in Table 8 and compared to the hypothesis made in
Section 5. Columns 1, 2 and 3 correspond respectively to the "Request for examina-
tion/withdrawal", "Final decision/withdrawal" and "Grant/refusal" equations.
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Table 8: Summary of results
expected observed
hypothesis (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
H1: Stock of applications + + + + - +
H2: X references - - - - - -
H2: Y references - - - 0 - 0
H3: D references + + + 0 0 0
H4: Forward citations + + + + + +
H5: Claims + + + + 0 0
H5: IPC assignments + + + 0 0 0
H6: Designated states + + + 0 0 0
H7: PCT I only - - +/- + - 0
H7: PCT I & II + + + 0
H8: Number of applicants + + + 0 + 0
H8: Number of inventors + + + 0 0 0
H9: Legal representative + + +/- + + 0
H10: Stock listed firms + + + 0 + 0
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze the determinants of the outcomes of patents applied
for by Danish rms at the EPO and to study the impact of the rmsexperience on these
outcomes. I used a database of 5,347 patent applications over the period 1978-1998 and
applied a Trivariate probit model accounting for self-selection.
The applicantspatenting history, as measured by the stock of applications, is found
to be an important factor in all stages of the application process. It seems that rms
having large patents portfolios act following a "trial and error" strategy, by applying for
huge numbers of patents and thereafter maintain the application only when the expected
probability of grant is high, leading to a positive e¤ect of the size of the applications
portfolio on the probability of grant.
The paper also investigates the determinants of the withdrawal decision of patent
applications. The results show that applicants tend to withdraw their applications when
the result of the preliminary search report issued by the patent o¢ ce is negative. Thus,
the applicants update their information set after receiving the search report and if the
expected probability of grant is low, that is, the search report shows evidence that the
claimed invention is not novel, they tend to withdraw their application. Withdrawals also
occur during examination, where the applicant can obtain additional information from
the examiner regarding the patentability of the invention. The results show that this
information is consistent with the results of the search report, since withdrawals are more
likely to occur when conicting prior art exists. A withdrawal is then an expected refusal.
Other important results of the paper are the following:
 The technological importance of a patent, as measured by the number of forward
citations is a crucial determinant of a successful application. Since an invention
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becomes potentially valuable if a patent is granted, the applicants are less likely to
withdraw it. Our results suggest that both applicants and examiners are aware of
the potential value of the application, since these applications have on average a
higher probability to be granted.
 Time-zero value correlates have little explanatory power.
 the grant/refusal decision made by the patent o¢ ce is more di¢ cult to predict than
earlier studies using an unconditional grant/other outcomes suggest.
In addition to the economic considerations, implications for the strategic management
of intellectual property rights can also be derived from the empirical model. Applicants
should be aware of the market potential of their applications and use the appropriate
application ways and ling strategies. Filing an application under the PCT treaty before
sending the application to the EPO in order to gain more time is not necessarily a good
strategy and can be costly for the applicants.
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Appendix
A Distribution of forward citations
Figure 4: Distribution of forward citations
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B Distribution of the number of claims
Figure 5: Distribution of claims9
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9The distribution is censorded when the number of claims is greater than 50.
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C Probit estimation
Probit model, probability to grant against all other outcomes
grant/other outcomes
Coeff. S.D.
Experience
Stock of applications -0.001 *** 0.000
Citations
Number of Backward citations 0.000 0.009
Number of type X citations -0.064 *** 0.014
Number of type Y citations -0.061 *** 0.016
Number of type D citations 0.051 0.037
Number of Forward citations 0.063 *** 0.008
Patent characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 0.013 0.017
Number of claims>10 0.055 0.042
Application ways
Number of designated states -0.008 0.005
PCT Chapter I only -0.100 0.064
PCT Chapter I & II 0.368 *** 0.053
Number of applicants 0.087 * 0.053
Number of inventors -0.014 0.016
Legal representative 0.945 *** 0.067
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.375 *** 0.107
Persons 0.002 0.112
Foreign firm 0.009 0.089
Limited compagnies 0.104 0.117
Sole proprietorships -0.046 0.119
Others -0.176 0.115
Technological areas
Electricity-electronics -0.081 0.088
Instruments 0.000 0.075
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals -0.059 0.073
Process engineering 0.060 0.072
Mechanical engineering 0.015 0.067
Constant -1.244 *** 0.291
Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 1 percent level
** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 5 percent level
* significantly different from the rejection rate at the 10 percent level
Annual year dummies are included
-3010.5691
5347
D Bivariate probit with selectivity
Here we estimate a Bivariate Probit Model with sample selection due to Van de Ven
and Van Praag (1981). In this model, data on a variable y1 (the patent is granted or
refused/withdrawn under examination) are observed only when another variable, y2 (the
applicants decision to request for examination or to withdraw the application) is equal
to one. Formally we have:
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yi1 = 1xi1 + i1; yi1 = 1 if y

i1 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi2 = 2xi2 + i2; yi2 = 1 if y

i2 > 0, 0 otherwise (4)
(i1; i2) s BV N(0; 0; 1; 1; )
(yi1; xi1) is observed only when yi2 = 1,
where the xi are the characteristics for the ith patent. Thus, there are three types of
observations with unconditional probabilities that need to be taken into account in the
construction of the log-likelihood function:
L =
X
y1=1;y2=1
ln [2 (1xi1; 2xi2; )] +
X
y1=0;y2=1
ln [2 ( 1xi1; 2xi2; )]
+
X
y2=0
ln [1   (2xi2)] , (5)
where  and 2 denote, respectively, the univariate and bivariate normal cumulative
distribution function, and  = cov(i1; i2). The likelihood function is maximized with
respect to 1, 2 and .
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Bivariate probit with selectivity estimation
Grant/
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Experience
Stock of applications 0.006 *** 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.000
Citations
Number of Backward citations -0.007 0.015 0.000 0.020
Number of type X citations -0.053 ** 0.023 -0.051 *** 0.015
Number of type Y citations -0.018 0.027 -0.055 *** 0.017
Number of type D citations 0.005 0.064 0.016 0.039
Number of Forward citations 0.043 *** 0.018 0.061 *** 0.009
Technical characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 0.035 0.034 0.001 0.018
Number of claims>10 0.180 ** 0.078 0.036 0.044
Application ways
Number of designated states -0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.006
PCT Chapter I 0.401 *** 0.103 -0.232 *** 0.071
PCT Chapter II 0.154 *** 0.057
Number of applicants 0.216 0.147 0.087 * 0.054
Number of inventors 0.040 0.039 -0.019 0.017
Legal representative 2.159 *** 0.097 0.356 *** 0.114
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.151 0.243 0.358 *** 0.111
Persons 0.151 0.251 -0.016 0.117
Foreign firm 0.357 0.232 -0.031 0.091
Limited compagnies -0.096 0.248 0.132 0.122
Sole proprietorships 0.424 0.265 -0.111 0.124
Others 0.085 0.252 -0.225 ** 0.119
Technological areas
Electricity-electronics -0.023 0.141 0.098 0.092
Instruments 0.150 0.127 -0.001 0.089
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 0.253 ** 0.133 0.136 0.090
Process engineering 0.189 0.120 0.134 0.085
Mechanical engineering -0.024 0.102 0.129 0.094
Constant -1.467 *** 0.308 -0.576 * 0.345
ρ
Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 1 percent level
** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 5 percent level
* significantly different from the rejection rate at the 10 percent level
Annual year dummies are included in both equations.
5347
-3676.463
Request for Examination/
Withdrawal (Refusal or withdrawal)
-0.060 (0.239)
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E Ordered Probit estimation
Ordered Probit estimation
Ordered probit (0=refusal, 1=withdrawal, 2=grant)
Coeff. S.D.
Experience
Stock of applications -0.001 *** 0.000
Citations
Number of Backward citations 0.001 0.008
Number of type X citations -0.057 *** 0.013
Number of type Y citations -0.050 *** 0.015
Number of type D citations 0.037 0.036
Number of Forward citations 0.060 *** 0.008
Patent characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 0.005 0.016
Number of claims>10 0.052 0.040
Application ways
Number of designated states -0.008 0.005
PCT Chapter I only -0.082 0.060
PCT Chapter I & II 0.278 *** 0.051
Number of applicants 0.067 0.050
Number of inventors -0.013 0.016
Legal representative 0.641 *** 0.058
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.344 *** 0.101
Persons 0.034 0.106
Foreign firm 0.039 0.085
Limited compagnies 0.124 0.110
Sole proprietorships -0.018 0.112
Others -0.126 0.108
Technological areas
Electricity-electronics -0.066 0.084
Instruments 0.007 0.071
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals -0.050 0.069
Process engineering 0.050 0.067
Mechanical engineering -0.009 0.062
Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 1 percent level
** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 5 percent level
* significantly different from the rejection rate at the 10 percent level
Annual year dummies are included
5347
-3708.8439
F Ordered Probit with selectivity
Here we estimate an Ordered Probit model with Selection, see for example Hall et al.
(2000)10 . In this model, data on a variable y2 (the patent is granted refused or with-
drawn under examination) are ordered and observed only when another variable, y1 (the
applicants decision to request for examination or to withdraw the application) is equal to
one. Formally we have:
10The reported estimations should be taken with precautions, since Hall et al. raise concerns about
identication of the model. See their paper for more details.
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yi1 = 1xi1 + i1; yi1 = 1 if y

i1 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi2 = 2xi2 + i2; yi2 = 1 if y

i2 > 0, 0 otherwise
(i1; i2) s BV N(0; 0; 1; 1; )
yi2 = 0 if yi1 = 1 and yi2  t1 (6)
yi2 = 1 if yi1 = 1 and t1 < yi2  t2
yi2 = 2 if yi1 = 1 and yi2 > t2
Ordered Probit with selectivity
0=refusal, 1=withdrawal,
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Experience
Stock of applications 0.005 *** 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.000
Citations
Number of Backward citations -0.008 0.017 0.001 0.010
Number of type X citations -0.054 ** 0.028 -0.511 *** 0.014
Number of type Y citations -0.019 0.033 -0.469 *** 0.017
Number of type D citations 0.005 0.068 0.006 0.037
Number of Forward citations 0.044 ** 0.022 0.582 *** 0.008
Technical characteristics
Number of IPC assignments 0.033 0.038 -0.005 0.017
Number of claims>10 0.182 ** 0.086 0.042 0.042
Application ways
Number of designated states -0.005 0.009 -0.006 0.005
PCT Chapter I 0.401 *** 0.155 -0.222 *** 0.068
PCT Chapter II 0.104 ** 0.055
Number of applicants 0.220 0.193 0.063 0.051
Number of inventors 0.040 0.047 -0.016 0.017
Legal representative 2.156 *** 0.114 0.278 ** 0.117
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.145 0.380 0.343 *** 0.112
Persons 0.145 0.379 0.019 0.118
Foreign firm 0.359 0.300 -0.002 0.094
Limited compagnies -0.102 0.387 0.155 0.121
Sole proprietorships 0.421 0.405 -0.066 0.122
Others 0.075 0.377 -0.186 0.118
Technological areas
Electricity-electronics -0.028 0.148 -0.095 0.091
Instruments 0.144 0.140 -0.015 0.078
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 0.250 0.161 -0.107 0.076
Process engineering 0.186 0.136 0.008 0.074
Mechanical engineering -0.027 0.116 -0.012 0.068
Constant -1.784 *** 0.366
ρ
Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 1 percent level
** significantly different from the rejection rate at the 5 percent level
* significantly different from the rejection rate at the 10 percent level
Annual year dummies are included in both equations.
2=grant
-0.179 (0.240)
5347
-3676.463
Request for Examination/
Withdrawal
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